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Abstract: In endogenous growth models with innovation and capital accumulation, Arnold 
(1998) and Blackburn, Hung and Pozzolo (2000) show that long-run growth of per capita income 
is independent of innovation activities; it is solely determined by preferences and the human 
capital accumulation technology. As a result, government policies do not affect long-run growth. 
This paper develops an endogenous growth model with innovation and (physical and human) 
capital accumulation to show that long-run growth depends on both innovation and capital 
accumulation technologies as well as on preferences and that government taxes and subsidies can 
have effects on the long-run growth rate. 
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In the endogenous growth literature, numerous studies have been devoted to understanding
the determinants of long-run economic growth. There are basically two alternative approaches
to the study of endogenous economic growth: capital accumulation approach and innovation
approach. The ﬁrst approach focuses on endogenous accumulation of physical or human capital
and thus stresses the importance of investment in physical or human capital (e.g., Romer 1986;
Lucas 1988; and Rebelo 1991). The second approach takes intentional innovation as the source
of growth and thus emphasizes the role of investment in innovation activities (e.g., Segerstrom,
Anant and Dinopoulos 1990; Aghion and Howitt 1992; and Grossman and Helpman 1991). Both
approaches capture an important aspect of the growth process.
As pointed out in Aghion and Howitt (1998, ch.3), capital accumulation and innovation
should not be treated as distinct causal factors, they are two aspects of the same process. On
the one hand, physical and human capital are essential inputs in innovation activities and in the
application of the new technologies resulting from innovation activities. On the other hand, the
new technologies open up new economic opportunities for investment in physical and human
capital to take place. Therefore, theoretically it is very important to integrate innovation and
capital accumulation into a single framework and explore the policy implications. Along this
line, many attempts have been made.1 Howitt and Aghion (1998) develops an integrated model
with innovation and physical capital accumulation. In their model, long-run growth depends on
both innovation and physical capital accumulation technologies; and government policies that
aﬀect these two activities have permanent eﬀects on growth.2 Arnold (1998) and Blackburn,
Hung and Pozzolo (2000) (hereafter BHP 2000) develop models with innovation and human
capital accumulation. The two papers show that long-run growth depends only on preferences
and human capital accumulation technologies. Furthermore, they show that government tax
and subsidy policies have no eﬀects on long-run growth.3
The objective of this paper is to examine the robustness of the results in Arnold (1998) and
BHP (2000). The basic framework is due to Howitt (1999). We incorporate endogenous human
1capital accumulation into Howitt’s (1999) model and correspondingly replace the labor input in
intermediate good production with human capital.4 As a result, we have two key assumptions
that diﬀerentiate our model from Howitt (1999) as well as Arnold (1998) and BHP (2000).
First, unlike Howitt (1999) where physical capital and labor are two inputs in intermediate good
production, intermediate goods in our model are produced using physical and human capital.
Second, diﬀerent from Arnold (1998) and BHP (2000), human capital is not the only input in its
own production; in addition to human capital, physical inputs are also required for producing
human capital.5 The extended version of Howitt(1999) still exhibits the non-scale feature of the
original model because the scale eﬀect of changes in the size of labor force is nulliﬁed by product
proliferation. In addition, unlike the original model in Howitt (1999), positive growth in labor
force is not a necessary condition for positive growth in per capita output.
In contrast to the results in Arnold (1998) and BHP (2000), we show that in general long-run
growth depends on preferences and all production technologies including innovation and physical
and human capital accumulation technologies. We also show that government tax and subsidy
policies have long-run growth eﬀects.
The two key assumptions mentioned above are responsible for our new results. The reason
why our assumptions lead to the diﬀerent results is as follows. Since the long-run growth rate
is completely determined by the equilibrium interest rate and the preference parameters, the
determinants of the equilibrium interest rate are also the determinants of the long-run growth
rate. As explained in previous studies (e.g., Rebelo 1991; Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin 1993;
and Stokey and Rebelo 1995), the rates of return to all investments should be the same in
equilibrium; if human capital is the only input in its own production, then the human capi-
tal production technology solely determines the equilibrium rate of return to investments and
thus the equilibrium interest rate. As a result, the long-run growth rate is solely determined
by individuals’ preferences and the human capital production technology; it is independent of
innovation activities and government policies. However, if physical inputs are required for hu-
man capital production, then the equilibrium rate of return to investments and the equilibrium
2interest rate depend on the parameters associated with innovation as well as those related to
physical and human capital accumulation, thus leading to the new results in our paper.6
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model. Section
3 characterizes the equilibrium and presents the results. The last section concludes.
2. The Model
We assume that the model economy is populated with identical households. The size of
population L is constant.7 The basic framework is due to Howitt (1999). We incorporate en-
dogenous human capital accumulation into this framework. As a result, both physical and human
capital accumulation are determined by intertemporal utility maximization of a representative
household. The production technologies and households’ preferences are described below.
2.1. Technologies
There are six types of production activities in this economy: ﬁnal good production, inter-
mediate good production, vertical and horizontal innovations, and physical and human capital
accumulation. It is assumed that perfect competition prevails in all sectors except the interme-
diate good sectors where there exists temporary monopoly power.
2.1.1. Final Good Production
The ﬁnal good production uses a continuum of intermediate goods and a ﬁxed factor as its





itdi; 0 <  < 1;
where Yt is ﬁnal output; X is the quantity of the ﬁxed factor; Qt is the measure of intermediate
goods; xit is the ﬂow of intermediate good i (i 2 [0;Qt]) and t represents time. The parameter
 measures the contribution of an intermediate good to the ﬁnal good production and inversely
measures the intermediate monopolist’s market power. The parameter Ait is the productivity
parameter of intermediate good i. For simplicity, the quantity of the ﬁxed factor is normalized





itdi; 0 <  < 1: (1)
The competitive ﬁnal good sector yields the inverse demand function for intermediate good i
pit = Aitx1
it ; 8i 2 [0;Qt]; (2)
where pit is the price of intermediate good i in terms of the ﬁnal good. Note that the ﬁnal good
is used as the numeraire for all prices.
2.1.2. Intermediate Good Production






it =Ait; 0 <  < 1; (3)
where  measures the contribution of physical capital to the intermediate good production. The
two inputs are deﬂated by the productivity parameter Ait to capture the fact that as technology
advances, better intermediate goods are more diﬃcult to produce.9 Given the wage rate wt, the
interest rate rt, and the ﬁnal sector’s demand for intermediate goods given by the inverse demand
function (2), each intermediate good producer chooses a monopolistic price pit to maximize its
proﬁt it
it = pitxit  wtHit  rtKit = Aitx
it  wtHit  rtKit: (4)
The solution to this maximization problem gives the proﬁt ﬂow at date s for an intermediate
good producer who uses a technology of vintage t (see Appendix 1)
ts = Amax
t (1  )Γys; (5)
where ys  Ys=(QsAmax
s ) is the productivity-adjusted output; Amax
t  maxfAitji 2 [0;Qt]g is the
productivity parameter of the leading-edge technology; and Γ  1 + , where  is a parameter
measuring the impact of each vertical innovation on the stock of public knowledge (see subsection
2.1.5 below).
42.1.3. Vertical Innovation
A successful vertical innovation improves an existing intermediate product, and replaces
the existing one in the ﬁnal good production. The successful innovator becomes the temporary
monopolist until the arrival of the next successful innovation in that sector. Assume that vertical
innovations follow a Poisson process, with a common arrival rate given by
t = nt; nt = Nvt=(QtAmax
t );  > 0; (6)
where  is the productivity parameter of vertical R&D, Nvt is the expenditures on vertical R&D
(measured in units of the ﬁnal good), and nt is the productivity-adjusted expenditure on vertical
R&D in each sector. Deﬂating vertical R&D expenditures by the leading-edge productivity
parameter is based on the assumption that the complexity of innovation increases proportionally
to the technology progress. As in Howitt (1999), we assume that the government subsidizes
both vertical and horizontal R&D expenditures at a proportional rate sn in order to encourage
investment in R&D. A vertical R&D ﬁrm chooses its R&D expenditure Nvt=Qt to maximize
its proﬁts ftVvt  (1  sn)Nvt=Qtg, where Vvt is the expected value of a vertical innovation.




t (r + )d]tsds.
Substituting (5) and the steady-state equilibrium conditions rt = r, nt = n, and yt = y into the
value function gives 10
Vvt =
Amax
t (1  )Γy
r + 
: (7)
Since we will consider equilibria with nt > 0 only, the ﬁrst-order condition for a vertical innova-
tor’s maximization problem is
Vvt=Amax
t = 1  sn: (8)
This equation says that the expected marginal beneﬁt of vertical R&D (the left-hand side) equals
the after-subsidy marginal cost of vertical R&D (the right-hand side).
2.1.4. Horizontal Innovation
A horizontal innovation aims at a new intermediate product. A successful innovator be-
5comes the monopolist of his newly created product until the product is improved by a vertical
innovation. Assume that the rate of new product innovation is
˙ Qt =  (Nht;Yt)=Amax
t ; (9)
where a dot on the top of a variable represents the time change rate of that variable, Nht is
the expenditures on horizontal R&D (measured in units of the ﬁnal good), and   is a concave,
constant-returns production function with positive marginal product. Equation (9) implies that
the average product ˙ Qt=Nht is a decreasing function of the fraction ht  Nht=Yt of ﬁnal output
allocated to horizontal R&D. Also assume that the productivity of a newly created intermediate
good is drawn randomly from the productivity distribution of existing intermediate goods. It
follows from this assumption that the expected value of a horizontal innovation is
Vht = E (Ait=Amax
t )Vvt; (10)
where E is an expectation operator. Similar to vertical R&D ﬁrms, a horizontal R&D ﬁrm
chooses its R&D expenditure Nht to maximize its proﬁts f[ (Nht;Yt)=Amax
t ]Vht  (1  sn)Nhtg.
We consider only the case with ht > 0, so the ﬁrst-order condition for this maximization prob-
lem is
 0(ht)Vht=Amax
t = 1  sn; (11)
where  (ht)   (ht;1) is assumed to have the following properties:  0(ht) > 0,  00(ht) < 0,
 0(0) > Γ and there exists ˆ ht 2 (0;1) such that  0(ˆ ht) < Γ.11 Equation (11) states that
the expected marginal beneﬁt of horizontal R&D (the left-hand side) equals the after-subsidy
marginal cost of horizontal R&D (the right-hand side).
2.1.5. Knowledge Spillovers
Following Caballero and Jaﬀe (1993) and Howitt (1999), we assume that growth in the
leading-edge productivity Amax
t comes from knowledge spillovers of vertical innovations. Specif-
ically,
gAt  ˙ Amax
t =Amax
t = nt;  > 0; (12)
6where gAt is the growth rate of the productivity of the leading-edge technology and, as mentioned
above,  is a parameter that measures the impact of each vertical innovation on the stock of
public knowledge. Since the productivity of a newly created intermediate good is randomly
drawn from the distribution of the existing intermediate goods, the productivity distribution
of new intermediate goods is identical to the productivity distribution of existing intermediate
goods. As a result, the distribution of relative productivity ait  Ait=Amax
t converges to the
invariant distribution Probfait  ag = F(a) = a1=, where 0 < a  1. As shown in Howitt
(1999), in the long run, E (Ait=Amax











= 1 + .
2.1.6. Physical and Human Capital Accumulation
For physical capital accumulation, we assume that each unit of consumption good foregone
can produce one unit of physical capital and there is no depreciation. Since ﬁnal output is
allocated among vertical R&D expenditures Nvt, horizontal R&D expenditures Nht, consumption
Ct, investment in human capital Dt, and investment in physical capital ˙ Kt, the stock of physical
capital evolves according to
˙ Kt = Yt  Nvt  Nht  Ct  Dt: (13)
Equation (13) is also the ﬁnal good market clearing condition.
For human capital accumulation, we assume that growth of human capital depends on the
amount of time devoted to education and physical investment in education. Speciﬁcally, the
human capital accumulation technology is given by





t ;  > 0; 0 <   1; (14)
where Zt is the total human capital stock; a bar on the top of a variable represents the per
capita value of that variable, so ¯ Zt is per capita human capital stock and ¯ Dt is per capita physical
investment in education (forgone output); vt is the amount of time devoted to education;  > 0
is the productivity parameter of human capital accumulation; and  measures the contribution
of human capital input to human capital accumulation.12 As will be seen later, the value of
7 will play a critical role in the interaction between innovation and capital (both physical and
human) accumulation in driving long-run growth. The value of  will also determine whether
government policies are eﬀective in aﬀecting long-run growth.
The human capital production technology speciﬁed in (14) has been widely adopted in the
literature (e.g., Rebelo 1991; Jones et al. 1993; and Stokey and Rebelo 1995). We can easily
observe that in our real world human capital production activities use a lot of physical inputs
such as buildings, equipments and other facilities. Bowen (1987) estimated that physical in-
puts account for 22% of the total explicit cost of acquiring higher education (excluding forgone
earnings) in the United States. Empirical studies on the contribution of physical inputs to hu-
man capital production are still rare.13 Recently, Jones and Zimmer (2001) ﬁnd that increases
in physical capital inputs are signiﬁcantly associated with higher academic achievement. This
ﬁnding, along with our casual observations, suggests that physical inputs are essential in human
capital production.14
2.2. Preferences
We assume that the representative household is endowed with one unit ﬂow of time which is
inelastically allocated between human capital accumulation vt and production 1  vt. We also









dt;  > 0; (15)
where ¯ Ct is per capita consumption;  is the constant rate of time preference; and  is the
elasticity of marginal utility.
Suppose that, in addition to subsidizing R&D, the government also subsidizes investments
in physical and human capital at rates sk and sd respectively and the government’s expenditures
are ﬁnanced by a lump-sum tax ¯ Tt (per capita), a physical capital income tax k, and a human
capital income tax z. Then given the government’s taxes and subsidies (k;z; ¯ Tt;sk;sd), the
representative household’s budget constraint is
¯ Ct = (1  z)wt(1  vt) ¯ Zt + rt(1  k) ¯ Kt  ¯ Tt  (1  sk) ˙ ¯ Kt  (1  sd) ¯ Dt; (16)
8where ¯ Kt is per capita physical capital asset.
The representative household chooses consumption ¯ Ct, investment in education ¯ Dt and time
allocation vt to maximize its life-time utility (15) subject to the human capital accumulation
technology (14) and the budget constraint (16). The ﬁrst-order conditions for the representative
household’s optimization problem are (see Appendix 2)
¯ C







t = t(1  z)wt ¯ Zt=(1  sk); (18)
t(1  )(vt ¯ Zt) ¯ D

t = t(1  sd)=(1  sk); (19)







t + t(1  z)wt(1  vt)=(1  sk) = t  ˙ t; (21)
(A.13) and (A.14) in Appendix 2, where t and t are the costate variables. Equation (17)
(respectively, (18), (19)) equalizes the marginal beneﬁt and the marginal cost of consumption
(respectively, time and human capital devoted to education, physical investment in education).
Equations (20) and (A.13)(respectively, (21) and (A.14)) are the optimal dynamic conditions
for physical (respectively, human) capital accumulation. Solving the above ﬁrst-order conditions
gives the conditions that determine the optimal time path of per capita consumption, physical
investment in education and time allocation
˙ ¯ Ct= ¯ Ct = (krt  )=; (22)
¯ Dt=vt = (1  )zwt ¯ Zt=; (23)
vt = gzt=(krt); (24)
where k  (1  k)=(1  sk), z  (1  z)=(1  sd) and gzt  ˙ ¯ Zt= ¯ Zt. Equations (22)-(24) are
the equilibrium conditions from the household side.
92.3. Government Budget Constraint
Assume that the government’s budget is balanced at each point in time, then we have
krtKt + zwt(1  vt) ¯ ZtL + ¯ TtL = sn (Nvt + Nht) + sdDt + sk ˙ Kt; (25)
where the left-hand side is the total tax revenue and the right-hand side is the total expenditure.
3. Steady-State Equilibrium and Results
We consider only steady-state balanced growth equilibria. In a steady-state balanced growth
equilibrium, stationarity is imposed on the allocation of time vt, and on the ratios of output,
consumption, and capital stock to productivity in terms of QtAmax
t , such as yt, ct = Ct=(QtAmax
t ),
and kt = Kt=(QtAmax
t ). Stationarity is also imposed on the amount of vertical R&D expenditure
per product nt, the fraction of ﬁnal output allocated to horizontal R&D ht, the interest rate
rt and the wage rate wt. In addition, the number of intermediate goods Qt, the leading-edge
productivity Amax
t , and human capital Zt grow at constant rates gQ, gA and gZ respectively. To
simplify our analysis, we reduce the equilibrium equation system to the following three conditions
that determine the fraction of ﬁnal good allocated to horizontal R&D h, productivity-adjusted
output y, and per capita output growth g (see Appendix 3):15
Horizontal R&D condition:
 0(h) = Γ; (H)
Vertical R&D condition:
g =
[Γ(1  )=(1  sn) +  (h)=]y  =k
=k + 1=
; (V)

























From (H), we can see that the fraction of ﬁnal output allocated to horizontal R&D h is inde-
pendent of the productivity-adjusted output y and the steady-state growth rate g, so equation
10(H) independently determines the fraction of ﬁnal output allocated to horizontal R&D. Given
the technology and policy parameters, there always exists a unique value of h satisfying (H):
h =  01 (Γ), where  01() is the inverse function of  0(). By substituting h =  01 (Γ) into
(V), we reduce the three equilibrium conditions to two equations (V) and (Z) that determine
the steady-state productivity-adjusted output y and the steady-state growth rate g. Now we
examine the properties of the steady-state equilibria.
[Figure 1 about here]
First, we look at the properties of the two equilibrium conditions (V) and (Z) and the
condition under which a steady-state equilibrium with positive growth exists. From (V), we
have @g=@y > 0; from (Z), we obtain @g=@y < 0 as long as  6= 1 (The case with  = 1 will
be discussed later). That is, the vertical R&D curve (V) is upward-sloping because a higher
(productivity-adjusted) output level raises the ﬂow of proﬁts to successful vertical innovators,
leading to more investment in vertical R&D and thus a higher steady-state growth rate; the
human capital accumulation curve (Z) is downward-sloping because a higher steady-state growth
rate (resulting from more investment in vertical R&D) increases the interest rate, and a higher
interest rate reduces the demand for physical capital and thus the productivity-adjusted output
(see Figure 1). In addition, the vertical R&D curve (V) intersects the y-axis at y = y1 > 0 and
the human capital accumulation curve (Z) cuts the y-axis at y = y2 > 0 (if  6= 1), where
y1 
=k




















These properties guarantee the following proposition:
Proposition 1. If y1 < y2, then there always exists a unique steady-state equilibrium with a
positive growth rate of per capita output.
11The intuitions behind this proposition can be easily seen by verifying that the condition
y1 < y2 is equivalent to the condition Vvt=Amax
t > 1  sn (at the point n = 0). That is, if the
condition y1 < y2 holds, then when investment in vertical R&D is zero (n = 0), the expected
marginal beneﬁt of vertical R&D (Vvt=Amax
t ) is greater than the marginal cost of vertical R&D
(1  sn). Under this condition, investment in vertical R&D is proﬁtable, therefore it is optimal
for proﬁt-maximizing R&D ﬁrms to invest in vertical R&D until the expected marginal beneﬁt
and the marginal cost of vertical R&D are equalized (Vvt=Amax
t = 1sn). This condition can be
guaranteed by various suﬃcient conditions concerning the values of the technology, preferences
and policy parameters such as a suﬃciently low subjective discount rate (low ), a suﬃciently
productive human capital accumulation technology (large ) and a suﬃciently large subsidy to
vertical R&D (large sn). However, if y1  y2, then investment in vertical R&D is not proﬁtable
and thus no R&D ﬁrms invest in vertical R&D. As a result, there is no growth in per capita
output.
The unique steady-state equilibrium has the following interesting features: First, as in recent
non-scale endogenous growth models (e.g., Jones 1995; Kortum 1997; Segerstrom 1998; Young
1998; and Howitt 1999), there is no scale eﬀect in terms of the size of population (labor force).
This is because the scale eﬀect of changes in the size of labor force is nulliﬁed by product
proliferation. Second, unlike some of the non-scale models (e.g., Jones 1995; Kortum 1997;
and Howitt 1999), positive population growth is not a necessary condition for positive long-
run growth. Instead, physical and human capital accumulation is a necessary condition for
a positive long-run growth rate. Third, diﬀerent from Arnold (1998) and BHP (2000), long-
run growth in our model depends not only on preferences and the human (and physical) capital
accumulation technologies, but also on both vertical and horizontal R&D activities. Furthermore,
government policies such as taxes on physical and human capital incomes and subsidies to
R&D and investments in physical and human capital have permanent eﬀects on growth (see
Proposition 2 below).
The standard comparative-static analysis of the steady-state equilibrium can be performed
12graphically to see the long-run growth eﬀects of all the parameters concerning preferences,
physical and human capital accumulation technologies and vertical as well as horizontal R&D
activities. For example, an increase in the subjective discount rate  decreases the long-run
growth rate by shifting both the vertical R&D curve (V) and the human capital accumulation
curve (Z) downward. Similarly, a rise in the productivity of human capital accumulation  shifts
the human capital accumulation curve (Z) upward, leading to an increase in the long-run growth
rate.
[Figures 2(a)-(c) about here]
We can also analyze the long-run growth eﬀects of government policies graphically. In this
paper, we consider taxes (k and z) on physical and human capital incomes and subsidies (sn;sk
and sd) to investments in R&D, physical and human capital accumulation. Note that when we
investigate the eﬀect of a tax or subsidy, we hold the other tax and subsidy rates constant and
leave the task of balancing the government budget (25) to residual changes in the lump-sum tax
¯ Tt.
Now we examine each of these policies. First, a decrease in the tax on physical capital income
or an increase in the subsidy to investment in physical capital shifts the two curves (V) and
(Z) upward, as a result, the long-run growth rate rises because the decrease in the tax or the
increase in the subsidy raises the expected marginal beneﬁt of vertical R&D and thus investment
in vertical R&D (see Figure 2(a)). Second, a decrease in the tax on human capital income or an
increase in the subsidy to investment in human capital accumulation shifts the human capital
accumulation curve (Z) upward, thus raising the long-run growth rate. Again, this is because
the decrease in the tax or the increase in the subsidy increases the expected marginal beneﬁt
of vertical R&D and thus investment in vertical R&D (see Figure 2(b)). Finally, a rise in the
subsidy to vertical or horizontal R&D shifts the vertical R&D curve (V) upward, leading to an
increase in the long-run growth rate because the rise in the subsidy to R&D lowers the marginal
cost of vertical R&D and thus induces more investment in R&D (see Figure 2(c)). Summarizing
13these results, we have
Proposition 2. If both human capital and physical inputs are required for human capital pro-
duction (0 <  < 1), then subsidies to investments in physical and human capital as well as
R&D always increase the long-run growth rate of per capita output while taxes on physical and
human capital incomes do the opposite.
The results regarding the growth eﬀects of taxation are consistent with the ﬁndings in the
recent literature on taxation using the exogenous growth models or the capital-based endogenous
models (e.g., Judd 1985; Chamley 1986; King and Rebelo 1990; Rebelo 1991; Pecorino 1993;
Jones et al. 1993; Devereux and Love 1994; and Stokey and Rebelo 1995).16 The results
concerning the growth eﬀects of innovation subsidies also conform with the ﬁndings in the
ﬁrst-generation R&D-based endogenous growth models with scale eﬀects (e.g., Romer 1990;
Grossman and Helpman 1991; and Aghion and Howitt 1992) and those in the very recent R&D
models without scale eﬀects (e.g., Aghion and Howitt 1998; and Howitt 1999).17
Our results are in sharp contrast with those in Arnold (1998) and BHP (2000). In Arnold
(1998) and BHP (2000), government policies are ineﬀective in inﬂuencing long-run growth. But
in our model, all the government policies we consider have eﬀects on the long-run growth rate.18
Naturally, we want to know why there is such a diﬀerence. This diﬀerence comes from the
diﬀerent assumptions about the inputs in human capital accumulation. In Arnold (1998) and
BHP (2000)(also in Lucas 1988,1990), human capital is assumed to be the only input in human
capital accumulation; but in our model, in addition to human capital, physical input is also
necessary for producing human capital. As discussed in those papers cited in the Introduction,
if human capital is the only input in human capital accumulation, then the human capital
production sector oﬀers an investment opportunity that yields a rate of return  regardless of
the rates of return to other investments. But in equilibrium all investments must have the same
rate of return, so any investment should have the rate of return . As a result, the steady-state
interest rate r is solely determined by , i.e., r = . In our model, if human capital accumulation


















Therefore, the steady-state interest rate r is the same as the rate of return to human capi-
tal investment  and thus the equilibrium condition concerning human capital accumulation
reduces to
g = (  )=: (Z0)
Graphically, the new human capital accumulation curve (Z0) is a horizontal line intersecting
the g-axis at g = (  )= (see Figure 3). Since the growth rate g of per capita output
is independent of the productivity-adjusted output y, this condition uniquely determines the
equilibrium growth rate of per capita output. We can easily see that the condition for positive
growth is  > ; that is, human capital accumulation is suﬃciently productive (large ) and/or
the individual’s subjective discount rate is suﬃciently small (small ). In this case, there are
only three determinants of long-run growth: the productivity  of human capital accumulation,
the rate of time preference  and the elasticity of marginal utility . The ﬁrst determinant aﬀects
the growth rate positively while the other two determinants do the opposite. As a result, we
have
[Figure 3 about here]
Proposition 3. If human capital is the only input in human capital accumulation ( = 1), then
the long-run growth rate of per capita output does not depend on R&D technologies; it depends
positively on the productivity of human capital accumulation and negatively on the individual’s
subjective discount and the elasticity of marginal utility.
These are basically the results in Arnold (1998) and BHP (2000).19 Therefore, we can see
that our results cover those in Arnold (1998) and BHP (2000) as special cases. We believe
that our model captures the fact that human capital is not the only input in human capital
15production. We can easily see that human capital production activities involve large amounts
of physical inputs such as buildings, equipments and other facilities. As technology advances,
physical investment is playing an increasingly important role in education and training.
4. Conclusions
This paper incorporates endogenous human capital accumulation into the R&D-based en-
dogenous growth model in Howitt (1999). We show that long-run growth in per capita output
depends not only on preferences and human capital production technology but also on R&D
activities and that government policies (various taxes and subsidies) have eﬀects on the long-run
growth rate. These results are in sharp contrast with the conclusions in the literature that long-
run growth is independent of R&D activities and solely determined by preferences and human
capital production technology and that government policies are ineﬀective in inﬂuencing long-
run growth. We also show that the conclusions in the literature are driven by the assumption
that human capital is the only input in its own production.20
We believe that our model is more general in the sense that it captures the fact that hu-
man capital production uses not only human capital but also physical inputs. However, which
assumptions and what kind of models better characterize the process of long-run growth is an
important empirical issue. The empirical results in the literature are far from conclusive. Some
studies appear to reject the policy-eﬀectiveness prediction (e.g., Engen and Skinner 1992; East-
erly and Rebelo 1993a, 1993b; and Mendoza, Milesi-Ferretti and Asea 1995) while others tend
to do the opposite (e.g., Bleaney, Gemmell and Kneller 2001). Testing various growth models
should be high on the agenda of empirical research on growth.
16References
Aghion, Philippe, and Peter Howitt. “A Model of Growth through Creative Destruction.”
Econometrica 60 (March 1992): 323-351.
Aghion, Philippe, and Peter Howitt. Endogenous Growth Theory. Cambridge, Mass: MIT
Press, 1998.
Arnold, Lutz G. “Growth, Welfare and Trade in an Integrated Model of Human Capital Accu-
mulation and Research.” Journal of Macroeconomics 20 (1998): 189-206.
Arnold, Lutz G. “Does Policy Aﬀect Growth.” Finanzarchiv 56 (1999): 141-164.
Blackburn, Keith, Victor T.Y. Hung, and Alberto F. Pozzolo. “Research, Development and
Human Capital Accumulation.” Journal of Macroeconomics 22 (2000): 81-105.
Bleaney, Michael, Norman Gemmell, and Richard Kneller. “Testing the Endogenous Growth
Model: Public Expenditure, Taxation, and Growth over the Long Run.” Canadian Journal
of Economics 34 (2001): 36-57.
Bowen, Howard Rothmann. The Costs of Higher Education. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass
Publishers, 1987.
Caballero, Ricardo J., and Adam B. Jaﬀe. “How High Are the Giants’ Shoulders: An Empiri-
cal Assessment of Knowledge Spillovers and Creative Destruction in a Model of Economic
Growth.” In: O. Blanchard and S. Fischer, eds., NBER Macroeconomics Annual. Cam-
bridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1993.
Chamley, Christophe. “Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equilibrium with
Inﬁnite Lives.” Econometrica 54 (1986): 607-622.
Devereux, Michael B., and David R.F. Love. “The Eﬀects of Factor Taxation in a Two-Sector
Model of Endogenous Growth.” Canadian Journal of Economics 27 (1994): 509-536.
Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman. Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy.
Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1991.
Easterly, William, and Sergio Rebelo. “Marginal Income Tax Rates and Economic Growth in
Developing Countries.” European Economic Review 37 (1993a): 409-417.
Easterly, William, and Sergio Rebelo. “Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth: An Empirical
Investigation.” Journal of Monetary Economics 32 (1993b): 417-458.
Eicher, Theo S. “Interaction between Endogenous Human Capital and Technological Change.”
Review of Economic Studies 63 (1996): 127-44.
Engen, Eric M., and Jonathan Skinner. “Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth.” NBER Working
Paper No. 4223, 1992.
17Howitt, Peter, and Philippe Aghion. “Capital Accumulation and Innovation as Complementary
Factors in Long-Run Growth.” Journal of Economic Growth 3(1998): 111-130.
Howitt, Peter. “Steady Endogenous Growth with Population and R&D Inputs Growing.”
Journal of Political Economy 107 (1999): 715-730.
Jones, Charles I. “R&D-Based Models of Economic Growth.” Journal of Political Economy 103
(August 1995): 759-784.
Jones, John T., and Ron W. Zimmer. “Examining the Impact of Capital on Academic Achieve-
ment.” Economics of Education Review 20 (2001): 577-588.
Jones, Larry E., Rodolfo E. Manulli, and Peter E. Rossi. “Optimal Taxation in Models of
Endogenous Growth.” Journal of Political Economy 101 (1993): 485-517.
Judd, Kenneth L. “Redistributive Taxation in a Simple Perfect Foresight Model.” Journal of
Public Economics 28 (1985): 59-83.
King, Robert G., and Sergio Rebelo. “Public policy and economic growth: developing neoclas-
sical implications.” Journal of Political Economy 98 (1990): S126-S151.
Kortum, Samuel S. “Research, Patenting and Technological Change.” Econometrica 65 (1997):
1389-1419.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. “On the Mechanics of Economic Development.” Journal of Monetary
Economics 22 (1998): 3-42.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. “Supply-Side Economics: An Analytic Review.” Oxford Economic Papers
42 (1990): 293-316.
Mendoza, Enrique G., Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, and Patrick Asea. “Do Taxes Matter for
Long Run Growth? Harberger’s Superneutrality Conjecture.” IMF Working Paper No.
95/79, 1995.
Mulligan, Casey B., and Xavier Sala-i-Martin. “Transitional Dynamics in Two Sector Models
of Endogenous Growth.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 108 (1993): 739-73.
Pecorino, Paul. “Tax Structure and Growth in a Model with Human Capital.” Journal of
Public Economics 52 (1993): 251-271.
Pecorino, Paul. “The Growth Rate Eﬀects of Tax Reform.” Oxford Economic Papers 46 (1994):
492-501.
Pecorino, Paul. “Inﬂation, Human Capital Accumulation and Long-Run Growth.” Journal of
Macroeconomics 17(1995): 533-42.
Rebelo, Sergio. “Long-run Policy Analysis and Long-Run Growth.” Journal of Political Econ-
omy 99 (1991): 500-521.
18Redding, Stephen. “The Low-Skill, Low-Quality Trap: Strategic Complementarities between
Human Capital and R&D.” Economic Journal 106 (1996): 458-70.
Romer, Paul M. “Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth.” Journal of Political Economy 94
(October 1986): 1002-37.
Romer, Paul M. “Endogenous Technological Change.” Journal of Political Economy 98 (1990):
S71-S102.
Segerstrom, Paul S. “Endogenous Growth without Scale Eﬀects.” American Economic Review
88 (1998): 1290-1310.
Segerstrom, Paul S., T.C.A. Anant, and Elias Dinopoulos. “A Schumpeterian Model of the
Product Life Cycle.” American Economic Review 80 (1990): 1077-91.
Young, Alwyn. “Growth without Scale Eﬀects.” Journal of Political Economy 106 (1998):
41-63.
Stokey, Nancy L., and Sergio Rebelo. “Growth Eﬀects of Flat-Rate Taxes.” Journal of Political
Economy 103 (1995): 519-550.
Zeng, Jinli. “Physical and Human Capital Accumulation, R&D and Economic Growth.” South-
ern Economic Journal 63 (1997): 1023-38.
19Appendix 1.
Derivation of Equation (5)
The ﬁrst-order conditions for intermediate monopolist i’s proﬁt maximization problem are




Equations (A.1) and (A.2) yields the intermediate good sector i’s demand for physical and
human capital, Kit and Hit. Substituting the values of Kit and Hit into (3) gives the optimal
output of intermediate sector i









Using equations (1), (A.1) and (A.2), along with the factor market equilibrium conditions
R Qt
0 Hitdi = (1  v) ¯ ZtL and
R Qt
0 Kitdi = Kt, we have the following solution
wt = 2(1  )Yt=[(1  vt) ¯ ZtL]; (A.4)












1+ (see Howitt 1999, Appendix A) and Amax
t  maxfAit;i 2
[0;Qt]g. In order to derive the expected values of vertical and horizontal innovations, we calculate
the intermediate producer i’s proﬁt ﬂow
it = Ait(1  )x
it = Ait(1  )Γyt; (A.7)
where yt  Yt=(Amax
t Qt). From (A.4)-(A.6) and the steady-state equilibrium conditions, we
know that the interest rate rt and the wage rate wt are constant in equilibrium. Therefore, the
proﬁt ﬂow at date s for an intermediate good producer who uses a technology of vintage t is
given by (5) in the text.
20Appendix 2.
The Solution to the Representative Household’s Optimization Problem
The current-value Hamiltonian function and the ﬁrst-order conditions for the representative
household’s utility maximization problem are
H = ¯ C1
t =(1  ) + t

(1  z)wt(1  vt) ¯ Zt + rt(1  k) ¯ Kt  ¯ Ct  ¯ Tt  (1  sd) ¯ Dt

=(1  sk)













t  t(1  z)wt ¯ Zt=(1  sk) = 0; (A.9)
@H
@ ¯ Dt
= t(1  )(vt ¯ Zt) ¯ D

t  t(1  sd)=(1  sk) = 0; (A.10)
@H
@ ¯ Kt









t + t(1  z)wt(1  vt)=(1  sk) = t  ˙ t; (A.12)
lim
t!1
ett ¯ Kt = 0; (A.13)
lim
t!1
ett ¯ Zt = 0; (A.14)
where t and t are the co-state variables. Rearranging equations (A.8)-(A.12) gives equations
(17)-(21) in the text.
Appendix 3.
Derivation of Equilibrium Conditions (V), (H) and (Z)
First of all, substituting (7) into (8) and (11) respectively gives
Γ(1  )y
r + 
= 1  sn; and (A.15)
 0(h)(1  )y
r + 
= 1  sn: (A.16)
21Combining (A.15) and (A.16), we obtain the horizontal R&D condition (H). Next, from (22),
we have
r = (g + )=k; (A.17)
where g is the growth rate of per capita output. From equation (A.4), (A.6) and the constancy
of wt and rt, we have
g = gZ = gY = gQ + gA; (A.18)
where gQ and gA are given by (9) and (12) respectively, i.e.,
gQ =  (h)y; gA = n: (A.19)
The deﬁnition gA   and gA = g  gQ = g  y (h) imply
 = [g  y (h)]=: (A.20)
Then substituting (A.17) and (A.20) into (A.15), we get the vertical R&D condition (V). Finally,
the human capital accumulation condition (Z) can be obtained by the following steps: First, we














Then (23), (24) and (A.22) lead to
d=z =

(1  sk)(1  z)(1  )g







where d  ¯ DtL=(Amax
t Qt) and z  ¯ ZtL=(Amax
t Qt). From the human capital accumulation
technology (14), we have
gZ = ˙ ¯ Zt= ¯ Zt = v (d=z)
1 : (A.24)





Y = output of ﬁnal good.
X = quantity of ﬁxed factor.
Ai = productivity of intermediate good i.
xi = quantity of intermediate good i.
 = contribution of intermediate goods to ﬁnal good production.
Q = measure (number) of intermediate goods.
pi = price of intermediate good i.
Ki = physical capital used in intermediate sector i.
Hi = human capital used in intermediate sector i.
 = contribution of physical capital to intermediate good production.
w = wage rate.
r = interest rate.
i = proﬁt ﬂow of intermediate sector i.
Amax = productivity of the leading-edge technology.
 = impact of a vertical innovation on the stock of public knowledge.
 = productivity of vertical R&D.
 = arrival rate of vertical innovations.
Nv = expenditures on vertical R&D.
n = productivity-adjusted expenditures on vertical R&D in each intermediate sector.
sn = subsidy rate to R&D.
f = productivity-adjusted value of variable F.
Nh = expenditures on horizontal R&D.
h = fraction of ﬁnal output allocated to horizontal R&D.
  = production function for horizontal R&D.
23E = expectation operator.
gf = growth rate of variable f.
ai = productivity of intermediate good i relative to the leading-edge productivity.
C = consumption.
D = human capital investment.
 = constant rate of time preference.
 = productivity of human capital production.
 = contribution of human capital to human capital production.
Z = human capital stock.
v = fraction of time allocated to human capital accumulation.
¯ F = per capita value of variable F.
 = elasticity of marginal utility.
L = size of population.
T = lump-sum tax.
k = tax rate on physical capital income.
z = tax rate on human capital income.
sk = subsidy rate to investment in physical capital.
sz = subsidy rate to investment in human capital.
K = physical capital stock.
 = costate variable associated with the budget constraint.
 = costate variable associated with the human capital production technology.
g = steady-state growth rate of output.
24Notes
1Other than those papers cited below, quite a number of other papers (e.g., Eicher 1996;
Redding 1996; and Zeng 1997) also study the interaction between innovation and capital accu-
mulation. But these studies have focuses diﬀerent from ours.
2Our model diﬀers from Howitt and Aghion (1998) in two aspects: First, unlike the Howitt
and Aghion model, our model does not exhibit scale eﬀects; second, in addition to physical capital
accumulation as in the Howitt and Aghion model, we also have human capital accumulation in
our model.
3It should be noted that Arnold (1998, 100) is fully aware that the policy-ineﬀectiveness
results obtained in his paper are not robust. The main objective of Arnold (1998) is to show
that theoretically the link between long-run growth and policies is fragile.
4We believe that incorporating human capital accumulation into Howitt (1999) itself is a
contribution of this paper.
5In endogenous growth models with capital accumulation as the only source of long-run
growth, Pecorino (1994, 1995) examines how introducing physical inputs into human capital
production aﬀects the eﬀectiveness of monetary and ﬁscal policies in inﬂuencing long-run growth.
6As a referee pointed out, the introduction of physical inputs into human capital accumulation
is not the only way to obtain the policy eﬀectiveness results. Alternatively, we can incorporate
knowledge as an input in human capital production to serve the same purpose.
7We do not normalize the size of population in order to see more clearly the non-scale feature
of our model.
8Note that human capital is used in both intermediate good production and human capital
accumulation. In equilibrium, the total amount of human capital used in the intermediate sectors
Ht 
R Qt
0 Hitdi equals the total amount of human capital stock Zt net of the amount of human
capital used in its own production vtZt, i.e., Ht = (1  vt)Zt. See subsection 2.1.6.
9As pointed out in Howitt (1999), this assumption is also technically necessary to guarantee
the existence of a steady state.
10Note that equation (7) holds true only in the steady state. This paper does not analyze the
transitional dynamics of the model economy but focuses on the steady state.
11These properties are needed to ensure the existence and uniqueness of the steady state.
12Note that if  = 1, then human capital is the only input in human capital production. This
is the speciﬁcation of the human capital accumulation technology used in Lucas (1988), Arnold
(1998) and BHP (2000).
13There is a large empirical literature on the impact of family and school inputs on educational
25outcomes. However, the role of physical inputs is almost completely ignored.
14In the calibration exercise for the US economy in Jones et al. (1993), the value of the share
of physical inputs in human capital production that satisﬁes the equilibrium conditions ranges
from 0.41 to 0.51 depending on the values of other parameters, suggesting a very important role
for physical inputs in human capital production.
15Since the solution for other variables is irrelevant to our analysis, it is skipped.
16Even though some empirical studies (e.g., Engen and Skinner 1992; Easterly and Rebelo
1993a, 1993b; and Mendoza, Milesi-Ferretti and Asea 1995) appear to reject the prediction that
government policies have permanent eﬀects on growth, the results in the literature are far from
conclusive. For example, Bleaney, Gemmell and Kneller (2001) recently found strong evidence
that government ﬁscal policies have long-run growth eﬀects.
17 Our results are diﬀerent from those in the second-generation R&D-based endogenous growth
models without scale eﬀects (e.g., Jones 1995; Segerstrom 1998; and Young 1998). The growth
eﬀects of all the taxes and innovation subsidies considered here do not exist in these models
because the forces that dissipate the increased reward to innovation from reducing taxes and/or
increasing subsidies in the same way as they dissipate the increased reward from a larger popu-
lation.
18However, it should be noted that the policy eﬀectiveness in our model depends on the
importance of physical inputs in human capital production (1  ). As the importance of
physical inputs decreases ( rises), government policies become less eﬀective. As shown below,
as  goes to 1, the curve Z becomes a horizontal line (see Figure 3). As a result, government
policies that shift the curve V but not the curve Z are completely ineﬀective. This suggests that
the results in Arnold (1998) and BHP (2000) are a useful approximation if physical inputs are
not too intensively used in human capital production.
19In Arnold (1998), since a log utility function ( = 1) is assumed, the long-run growth rate
reduces to g =   . In BHP (2000), the expression for the long-run growth rate is slightly
diﬀerent due to their assumptions about human capital depreciation and the threshold level of
human capital required by R&D ﬁrms.
20As a referee pointed out, in addition to the human capital accumulation technology, other
factors, such as low marginal returns to human capital in R&D and international knowledge
spillovers, may also cause policies to be less eﬀective than the early growth models suggest (see
Arnold 1999).
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Figure 3: Existence of Steady-State Equilibrium: 
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